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Academics and policymakers have
shown an increasing interest in the role
that a well-developed financial sector
might play in defining a path of eco-
nomic development characterized by
sustainable, long-run economic growth.
Theoretical modeling has suggested the
importance to growth of a highly de-
veloped banking industry and capital
markets. Extensive empirical evidence
has corroborated this hypothesis. The
research focus is now directed toward
a deeper understanding of the mechan-
ics of the relationship between financial
development and economic growth. In
other words, which characteristics of the
financial industry seem to have an im-
pact on capital accumulation? What is
the role of the regulatory environment
in which banks and capital markets op-
erate? How does the quality of law en-
forcement, reflected in protection of
creditors and property rights, affect the
role played by banks and capital mar-
kets? How does the level of efficiency
of these segments of the financial sector
affect firms’ access to investment funds
and, therefore, capital accumulation?
Finally, does it matter if banks are pri-
vately owned or government owned?
In this Chicago Fed Letter, I present em-
pirical evidence on these issues. While
the above questions have been asked
before, I believe this is the first article
to offer a broad, panoramic view of this
important topic of research.1 Overall,
I find evidence of stronger growth in
countries characterized by a good legal
structure, a less restrictive banking reg-
ulatory regime, efficient banks and
capital markets, and a low degree of
government ownership in banking.
The empirical exercise proceeds in two
steps. First, I measure the relationship
between the growth rate and indicators
of legal quality, banking regulatory re-
strictions, bank and capital market ef-
ficiency, and government ownership
in banking for a set of countries from
1980 to 1990. This is the standard ap-
proach followed in most studies, begin-
ning with the seminal work by King and
Levine (1993). Second, I adopt a meth-
odology used by Rajan and Zingales
(1998), which measures the effects of
the above-mentioned financial charac-
teristics on the growth rates of a num-
ber of different industrial sectors
within each country.
Country growth rates and financial
sector characteristics
I obtain the first set of results by estimat-
ing regressions based on the model in
figure 1. Column 1 reports the results
of a first regression, where the level of
development of the credit industry is
captured by total domestic credit to the
private sector over gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP), while the level of activity in
the capital markets is captured by total
stock market capitalization over GDP.
If the development of either sector of
the financial industry is important for
overall industry growth, then we should
find a positive and statistically significant
coefficient associated with the two mea-
sures, indicating that countries with
higher levels of financial development
also display, on average, higher levels
of growth. This is confirmed by the
results in column 1. For example, the
regression results suggest that a coun-
try whose level of bank development
in 1980 was in the top quartile of the
cross-country distribution would have
experienced a 2% higher yearly average
industry growth rate than a country
with a level of bank development in the
lowest quartile. This is a potentially
large contribution to growth.
I now explore the role of some of the
financial sector’s most important char-
acteristics. First, I look at the legal en-
vironment financial markets operate in.
I use two common measures. The first
is an index of the quality of accounting
standards, computed for each country
by the Center for International Finan-
cial Analysis and Research (CIFAR). This
composite indicator reflects the standards
of disclosure of firms’ annual reports
(for more details, see Rajan and Zingales,
1998). The poorer such standards, the
more difficult it would be for a firm to
raise external finance on capital mar-
kets. This should translate into a high-
er information cost that a supplier of
funds (such as a bank) has to sustain to
determine the quality of an entrepreneur.
All else equal, if financial markets have
a positive role in enhancing capital ac-
cumulation, we would expect a notice-
ably stronger impact in countries with
better accounting standards. The results
in column 2 are consistent with this
prediction, as the coefficient for the
accounting standard index is positive
and significant.
The second measure of the quality of
the legal environment is a more gener-
al index of the efficiency and integrity
of the legal system, computed by Busi-
ness International Corporation (see
Rajan and Zingales, 1998). This index
gives an indication of the extent to
which laws are enforced. In general, a
lower ranking will imply higher trans-
action costs and, consequently, lower
efficiency of financial markets. The ex-
pectation, therefore, is that countries
with a higher quality legal system should
experience faster growth. The results
in column 3 confirm this. Notice that
in this regression, the coefficient of
accounting standards loses significance.
This is presumably due to some degree
of collinearity with the quality of law
index. Indeed, the correlation between
the two measures, (not shown in the fig-
ure), is above 0.5 and highly significant.1. Financial characteristics and industry growth
Next, I explore the role of the regula-
tory environment affecting the opera-
tion of the banking industry, using Barth,
Caprio, and Levine’s (1999) cross-coun-
try indicator of restrictions on banks’
operating activity.2 Their indicator sig-
nals whether banks in a country can,
for example, be active in the securities,
insurance, or real estate markets, and
whether banks can own or control non-
financial firms (and vice versa). We might
expect that where banks face greater
restrictions in their potential range of
activities, credit may be poorly allocated
and/or less credit may be available to
entrepreneurs. This would imply that
in a more restrictive regulatory environ-
ment, a country may experience slower
growth. However, my results (column 4)
do not support this prediction. While
the coefficient on banking restrictions
is negative (a higher index means strict-
er restrictions), it is not statistically sig-
nificant from zero.
I pointed out above that a poor system
of law or a heavily regulated banking in-
dustry may affect banks’ and capital mar-
kets’ degree of efficiency and through
this channel the ability of the financial
industry to promote capital accumula-
tion and growth. Now, I test directly the
effect of efficiency in the banking sec-
tor or capital markets on growth in non-
financial industries. Column 5 in figure
1 shows the results of a regression that
includes a common proxy for the effi-
ciency of a country’s banking sector,
measured by the average interest rate
margin that banks in that country charge
to their clients. I also include an indi-
cator of the volume of trade in stock
markets, which is commonly considered
an indicator of efficiency of capital mar-
kets.3 The result does not indicate a sig-
nificant effect for the margins variable,
while there is stronger evidence that
industries do grow more, all else equal,
in countries where capital markets pro-
mote a higher level of trading activity.
Finally, I investigate the importance of
government ownership in the banking
industry. Recent research has pointed
out that government-owned financial
institutions may be less efficient than
privately owned institutions.4 Column
6 shows the results of a regression in
which the share of total bank assets that
are government owned is included as a
proxy of the relative degree of impor-
tance of government ownership (see
Demirgüç-Kunt and Levine, 1999). As
the results indicate, the coefficient of
the state variable is not significant, hence
it does not provide evidence consistent
with the hypothesis of a negative role
played by a government active in the
credit industry.
A better identification strategy
The above regression analysis highlights
some significant associations between
financial industry characteristics and
growth in nonfinancial sectors. However,
while extremely popular, the specifica-
tion model in figure 1 is usually criti-
cized because it may be exposed to an
omitted variable bias and it is hard to rule
out the possibility of reverse causality. For
practical reasons (e.g., lack of data or
limits on degrees of freedom), the vec-
tor of country controls will always omit
some variables, thus raising the concern
that the estimated coefficient of the in-
cluded regressors may be biased (this
would explain, for example, the observed
instability of some of the estimated
coefficients across the regressions of
figure 1). Also, with a cross-sectional
regression it is hard to make the case
for causality clearly running from the
right-hand-side regressors to the left-
hand-side dependent variable. In other
words, we cannot be sure whether in-
dustrial growth is spurred on by a well-
developed financial industry, or whether
a country with significant growth poten-
tial, or that has already experienced fast
growth, attracts the establishment and
development of banks and capital mar-
kets. (Rajan and Zingales, 1998, clearly
summarize these issues.)
An alternative approach that is less
exposed to these potential problems ex-
ploits information on specific character-
istics of industrial sectors. As Rajan and
Zingales (1998) pointed out, industrial
sectors differ from one another for sec-
tor-specific reasons (e.g., technology)
in terms of their firms’ degree of depen-
dence on external sources of finance.
For instance, firms in a sector such as
leather or tobacco will typically gener-
ate larger amounts of cash flow that
could be used to finance investment than
firms in sectors such as pharmaceuticals
The results below are based on the following model specification:
Growthj,k = Constant + A × Industry Indicator Variablesj + B × Country Controlsk 
+ α
× Share of total value addedj,k + Λ Λ Λ Λ Λ × Financial Characteristicsk 
 + Errorj,k
12 3 4 5 6
Bank size 0.081*** 0.091*** 0.060*** 0.059*** 0.041*** 0.052**
Market 0.025*** 0.016** 0.027*** 0.027*** 0.014* –0.021
capitalization
Accounting 0.070*** 0.032 0.030 –0.004 –0.02
standards
Rule of law 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.011*** 0.004*
Bank powers –0.001 0.003 0.014**
Bank efficiency –0.003 0.006*




R2 0.13 0.19 0.26 0.26 0.27 0.19
Observations 1,150 984 984 984 966 617
Notes: The dependent variable is 1980–90 growth in value added for each of 41 manufacturing sectors j in 36 countries
k (both developed and developing countries). The indicator variables control for sector-specific factors that may affect
industrial growth; the country controls include the logarithm of GDP per capita and the fraction of total manufacturing value
added of each sector in each country in 1980. The estimated coefficients of these variables as well as those of the industry
indicators are not reported. ***, **, and * indicate statistical significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, based
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2. Within-industry effects of financial characteristics
The results below are based on the following model specification:
Growthj,k = Constant + A × Industry Indicator Variablesj 
 + B × Country Indicator Variablesk 
+ α
× Share of total value addedj,k + × External Financial Dependencej × Financial Characteristicsk + Errorj,k
Effect on industry growth of
Total Market
Bank Market financial Accounting Rule Bank Bank trading Government-
size capitalization development standards of law powers efficiency volume owned banks
Coefficient  0.127*** 0.061** 0.07*** 0.135*** 0.004** –0.02** –0.005* 0.094*** –0.075***
R2 0.29 0.28 0.29 0.42 0.34 0.38 0.33 0.28 0.23
Observations 1,150 1,150 1,150 984 1,085 1,035 1,071 1,140 741
Notes: The reported coefficients  are those of the interaction term between external financial dependence and the financial variable in each column. The dependent variable is 1980–90 growth
in value added for each of 41 manufacturing sectors j in 36 countries k (both developed and developing countries). The indicator variables control for industry-specific or country-specific factors
that may affect industrial growth. The estimated coefficients of these indicator variables, as well as that of the share of total manufacturing value added, are not reported. ***, **, and * indicate
statistical significance, respectively, at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level, based on heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.
or computers. Then, if financial devel-
opment affects industry growth because
it allows firms to have better access to
investment funds, firms in sectors that
are highly dependent on external fi-
nance should grow much faster in coun-
tries with a more developed financial
sector than the same types of firms in
less developed economies.
This empirical exercise is based on the
model in figure 2. The effects of the
characteristics of the financial industry
are captured by the estimated coefficient
of the term of interaction between the
degree of external financial dependence
of an industrial sector with each of our
financial variables (first row in figure 2).
With this identification strategy, it is
possible to include vectors of both in-
dustry and country indicator variables,
which absorb the effect of any sector-
or country-specific factors affecting in-
dustry growth. (The country indicator
variables substitute for the vector of
country controls used in figure 1.) This
is the most effective way to deal with the
omitted variable issue mentioned above.
This identification strategy is also less
exposed to the issue of reverse causality,
in that it is based on specific mechanisms
through which those financial charac-
teristics should have an impact on in-
dustry growth. If, for example, bank
efficiency implies lower cost of credit
to entrepreneurs and higher quantity
of funds available, then firms in sectors
that are especially dependent on bank
credit will benefit disproportionately
more from being in a country with high-
er bank efficiency. The direction of
causality would be reversed if, instead,
the development of the financial sec-
tor were due to growth in industries
that are especially dependent on bank
finance. While this is possible, it is much
less likely. The results in figure 2, there-
fore, should be interpreted as more
robust than those yielded by the sim-
pler cross-country regressions.
I begin with a regression where the ex-
ternal financial dependence of an in-
dustry sector is interacted with the level
of bank development (called “bank
size” in the figure) of a country. The
positive and significant coefficient is
evidence consistent with the hypothe-
sis that bank development matters for
growth: Firms in sectors that depend
more than others on external sources
of finance (banks and capital markets)
for their investment projects are shown
to grow faster in countries with a more
developed banking industry. In column
2, the interaction term is with the level
of stock market capitalization. Apply-
ing the same reasoning to interpret this
result, the positive and significant co-
efficient of the interaction term con-
firms the important role of capital
markets for growth. Likewise, the over-
all importance of financial development
is captured by the significant coefficient
of the interaction with the aggregate
indicator, the sum of total domestic
credit and total market capitalization
(column 3).
Continuing in the same fashion as in
figure 1, I now analyze the importance
of the legal environment. In column 4,
I have interacted the level of external
finance of each industry sector with the
indicator of accounting standards, which
displays a positive and significant coeffi-
cient. The important role played by a
functioning legal system is confirmed
by the regression in column 5, where the
interaction with the indicator of the rule
of law is also positive and significant.
Next, column 6 in figure 2 shows the
results of a regression where the interac-
tion is with the indicator of bank regu-
latory restrictions. With the standard
cross-sector specification, I do not find
evidence of a significant role played
by the regulatory environment banksoperate in. Adopting this alternative
specification, however, I observe that
firms in sectors more dependent on ex-
ternal finance grow less in countries with
a more restrictive banking environment
(column 6). This would be consistent
with the hypotheses discussed above,
that where banks face more restrictions
in their potential range of activities,
credit may be poorly allocated and/or
less credit may be available to entrepre-
neurs, thus dampening the growth po-
tential of those sectors that rely more
heavily on bank credit.
Next, I again explore the role of the
two variables proxying for the level of
efficiency of banks and capital markets.
The results are presented in columns
7 and 8, respectively. While the cross-
section regressions above indicated a
non-significant effect of the level of bank
efficiency, the new regressions indicate
that both an efficient banking industry
and capital markets have a growth en-
hancing effect. Finally, column 9 pre-
sents the result of a regression where
external financial dependence is inter-
acted with the variable measuring the
importance of government-owned banks.
Although the cross-section regression
had not indicated any significant effect
on growth associated with a heavy gov-
ernment presence in the banking sec-
tor, the results of the alternative model
specification are consistent with a nega-
tive role of government-owned banks.
Firms in highly dependent sectors grow
less in countries where the government
has a more important presence in the
banking industry.
Conclusion
This empirical exercise provides evi-
dence on the role of specific characteris-
tics of the financial industry in economic
growth. Specifically, my results indicate
the importance of the sophistication
of the legal environment, the banking
regulatory regime, the level of efficien-
cy of both banks and capital markets,
and the degree of government owner-
ship in banking to growth in industry
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